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How should a supranational parliament be elected? What kind of parliament is
the European Parliament? Such are the questions that emerge from a number of
judgments of national constitutional courts in the last few years: in these cases, the
constitutionality of derogations from strict voting equality like electoral thresholds
have often been at stake. In dealing with electoral issues, constitutional courts also
inevitably address the nature of the supranational assembly in Strasbourg and
Brussels and its role in the European model of “representative democracy”, as the
Treaty puts it. 
On two occasions, the German Federal Constitutional Court has found provisions
containing, respectively, 5% and 3% electoral thresholds to be unconstitutional
(judgments of 9 November 2011 and 26 February 2014). According to
the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the very peculiar functioning of the supranational
representative democracy could not justify such a limitation of voting equality. On
the contrary, the Czech Constitutional Court has not struck down a provision of
the Czech Act on Elections of the European Parliament regulating a 5% threshold
(judgment of 19 May 2015).
The Italian case and its factual background
In December 2018, the Italian Constitutional Court has joined this discussion
(judgment no. 239/2018). Although two previous attempts to challenge the Italian 4%
threshold had been rejected on procedural grounds (judgments no. 271/2010 and
110/2015), this time the Court has ruled on the merits. In so doing, the Court has had
to engage with the arguments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, whose decisions
had been supportively cited by the referring judge. The Constitutional Court has not
subscribed to this line of reasoning: rather, it has sketched a different interpretation
of the role and tasks of the European Parliament in the EU constitutional order,
thereby ultimately justifying the electoral threshold. In this respect, the judgment
does not only enrich the complex case law of the Italian Constitutional Court on
electoral issues (in which, by the way, the German constitutional case law has
served as an important source of comparative arguments) but it also represents a
significant contribution to the judicial conversation within the composite European
constitutional order. 
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As regards the facts of the case, at the European election of 25 May 2014 the right-
wing party Fratelli d’Italia had a vote share of 3,7% and did not get any seats in
the European Parliament. Party chair Giorgia Meloni lodged a complaint before
the regional administrative court and later before the Consiglio di Stato, i.e. the
Italian top administrative court. The Consiglio di Stato referred the constitutionality
of the 4% threshold to the Constitutional Court. Basically, it alleged that the
impugned provision violated the principles of democracy and voting equality and
struck an unreasonable between the interests and values at stake. Most of all,
the unreasonableness of the electoral threshold is a consequence of the peculiar
nature of the EU institutional system, in which the Commission does not properly
have to command the confidence of the Parliament throughout the duration of its
term. Therefore, the 4% threshold, which represents an obvious limitation of voting
equality, lacks sufficient justification. As can be seen, the phrasing of the referral
decree shows the influence of the arguments of the Bundesverfassungsgericht in the
European legal space.
The current state of affairs in EU law
Under the current state of affairs, the constitutionality of an electoral threshold
in European elections is primarily an issue of national constitutional law. At the
supranational level, the Direct Elections Act in its version currently in force only
imposes on the Member States the adoption of proportional representation. Member
States, in turn, may provide for derogations from the general scheme of proportional
representations. Among the conceivable derogations, electoral thresholds that
exclude smaller political parties from representation in the European Parliament
occupy a central place in constitutional and political debates. According to the Direct
Elections Act, Member States “may set a minimum threshold for the allocation of
seats” that “may not exceed 5 per cent of votes cast” (Art. 3(1)). 
Some national constitutional orders, however, embrace a strict notion of voting
equality, and derogations from proportional representation are constitutionally
admissible insofar as they are justified by compelling reasons. In the case of national
EU electoral laws, the constitutionality of electoral thresholds can be measured,
among other factors, against the functioning of the European Parliament and, more
generally, of the institutional system of the Union. As of today, twelve Member States
have introduced electoral thresholds in their own EU electoral laws. Among them,
Italy introduced a 4% threshold in 2009 in order to reduce party fragmentation and to
strengthen the relative weight of the main Italian political parties within the European
Parliament. 
The arguments of the Italian Constitutional Court
As mentioned before, in its recent rulings on electoral laws the Italian Constitutional
Court made reference to the case law of the Bundesverfassungsgericht, also in order
to provide additional reasons for some rather innovative interpretations of domestic
constitutional provisions. In the latest judgment, differences clearly prevail over
similarities. This is true both in general and specific terms.
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On the one side, the Court embarks on a distinctive reading of the purpose of
proportional representation. The evolution of parliaments has showed that it is
necessary to overcome the idea of a “purely proportional registration of social and
political pluralism” and to put in place adequate mechanisms so as to ensure the
efficiency of decision-making processes. In light of this, mechanisms of political
representation need to be re-considered. Indeed, political representation should
not be seen as a “mere mirror” of a given society. The differences between this
line of reasoning and the arguments of the German Constitutional Court is striking:
the latter strongly emphasises the need to implement voting equality fully when
proportional representation is adopted. Accordingly, legislative discretion is heavily
reduced, all the more so when it comes to providing for derogations. A recurring
idea in the German case law is the inherent partisanship of parliamentary majorities
when it comes to electoral issues (“die parlamentarische Mehrheit gewissermaßen
in eigener Sache tätig wird”). The Italian Court, in turn, emphasises the wide
discretionary power of the legislature that, however, should not be exercised in a
“manifestly unreasonable” way.
On the other side, the second part of the reasoning of the Italian Court is devoted
to the meaning and purpose of the electoral threshold in the electoral law for the
European Parliament. As mentioned before, the referral decree of the Consiglio di
Stato made explicit reference to the case law of the German Federal Constitutional
Court. However, the Corte costituzionale clearly departs from this interpretive
approach. In doing so, it cites the different result of the Czech judgment. The
Italian 4% threshold can be seen as compatible with the Constitution insofar as
it is instrumental in providing governmental stability and ensuring the functioning
of the European Parliament. On this point, the differences between the Italian
judgment and the German case law are most evident. First, the goal of a well-
functioning assembly characterises the European Parliament in similar terms as
it happens in national parliaments. In this respect, the Italian Court refrains from
tracing a clear distinction between national and supranational democracy as well as,
correspondingly, between a national parliament and the European Parliament. In this
respect, there is, at least to some extent, a continuity rather than a hiatus between
national and supranational democracy.
This interpretive framework enables the Italian Court to draw clearly different
conclusions from the analysis of EU primary law than the German Court did in 2011
and 2014. After the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, “an unquestionable change
of the form of government of the European Union” is taking place. The increasing
relevance of the legislative, budgetary, control and consultative powers of the
European Parliament combinedly testify to this trend. Furthermore, the European
Parliament elects the President of the European Commission and can force the
Commission to resign if a motion of censure is passed. Under such circumstances,
appropriate tools to favour the formation of a majority within the Parliament are
urgently needed. The 4% threshold passes the reasonableness (or proportionality)
test because its task is to prevent excessive party fragmentation and, consequently,
facilitate the emergence of a majority. The issue comes full circle, as the highly
political nature of electoral laws is matched by the wide discretion accorded to the
legislature. Unlike the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the Italian Court has not looked
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into the daily routine of the European Parliament and the way its parliamentary
groups co-operate or confront each other: rather, it has pointed to an ongoing
process of constitutional transformation that plausibly makes the case for the
compatibility of the electoral threshold with the Italian Constitution.
A final point which deserves mention is whether or not a national electoral threshold
is actually able to attain its alleged purpose if only some Member States have
introduced them into their own electoral laws for the European Parliament. This
issue was not really addressed by the Bundesverfassungsgericht in its two
judgments, if not for the dissenting opinion submitted by Justices Di Fabio and
Mellinghoff (BVerfGE 129, 300, 352-53), whereas the Czech Court dealt with it
extensively. Again, the Italian Constitutional Court has stressed that the rationalising
effort of the Italian electoral law is part of an ongoing process of transnational
constitutional change, whose ultimate result should be the adoption of a uniform
electoral procedure under Art. 223(1) TFEU and a decisive rationalisation of power
relationships within the European Parliament.
An ongoing institutional evolution
Because of some distinctive features of the Italian model of constitutional review,
the Corte costituzionale has rendered relatively few Europa-Urteile in which
specific aspects of the supranational legal order and its institutional system were
in the spotlight (this is not the case, of course, of the relation between EU law
and domestic law). In light of this, the present judgment represents an exception:
the Court has addressed crucial features of the form of government of the Union
in order to assess the “reasonableness” of a legislative derogation from voting
equality. The Court has presented its own arguments quite concisely and hinted at
an institutional evolution that is still ongoing. Unlike the Bundesverfassungsgericht,
which focused in-depth on the European state of affairs at a given stage, the Corte
costituzionale has pointed to a gradual evolutionary development towards
“a rationalisation of the representation of political forces within the European
parliamentary assembly”. In this respect, Italy, like the other Member States carries
a peculiar responsibility: the process may well be incremental but the decisions of
national legislatures can be seen as the necessary intermediate steps. As the Court
stated, the Italian 4% threshold represents, just like those of any other Member
States, “a necessary (but not sufficient) condition to pursue this goal”. As I have
stressed above, it is possible to detect a circular relationship between the piecemeal
evolution that is gradually taking shape and the wide discretionary power of the
national legislature in adopting the electoral law for the European Parliament: the link
between them – and the most relevant difference with the interpretive approach of
the Bundesverfassungsgericht – is that both national parliaments and the European
Parliament have to face similar challenges.
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